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Copy # 21/
11 September 1963

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT : Recommendations Concerning the Relationship Between the Effort Devoted to Collecting Current Satellite Photography and the Effort Devoted to the Exploitation of Photography Already Available

1. Summary:

A panel of representatives from OSI, ORR, OCI and ONE was assembled to consider the following questions:

(a) What is the required frequency of coverage of various target categories by photographic reconnaissance?

(b) Are we willing to reduce this required number to release more time for PI research in depth?

The panel found that:

(a) A number of important target categories require coverage once a quarter, and most target categories require coverage at least once every six months, either of the complete target system, or, much more often, a representative sample. Most of the area of the Soviet Union should be searched once a year.

(b) We believe that at least 12 successful "M"-type satellite missions per year would be required to satisfy our requirements for coverage, not counting on product from higher resolution systems, or alternatively, perhaps nine successful "J"-type missions.

(c) The resulting workload would prolong a situation in which there is insufficient photo interpretation capacity available to handle all of the current readout reporting required and to do all the PI research in depth that we need. In spite of this, we do not believe it desirable to reduce the number of missions flown in order to make more PI time available to NPIC for research.

NRO review(s) completed.

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2. The panel obtained a statement of the requirements of the various Offices for current photographic reconnaissance by target categories such as missile deployment, atomic energy, missile production, CW/BW, etc. We found that in general, the Offices require coverage of categories of targets at least every six months, although in a number of high priority cases such as Tyura Tam, coverage is required at least quarterly. In some cases the Offices require coverage of a complete target system, but in most cases coverage of a representative sample is acceptable. We have reviewed coverage of these categories of targets on the basis of the reconnaissance program already carried out and find that the reconnaissance carried out during the past two years has met most of the requirements but has failed to meet all of them. Furthermore, during the past two years there has been considerable variation in the degree of coverage. For example, coverage of ICBM launch sites was stated to require coverage of 50 percent of the sites quarterly. During April-June 1963 the reconnaissance program covered all except three launch sites. In January-March 1963, however, there was no coverage.

3. In our analysis of the reconnaissance program already accomplished we discovered that a number of important targets have not been seen for a long time. The attached table (Tab A) shows the month in which various of the most important targets were last seen. It should be noted that quite a number were not seen during 1963.

4. It is difficult to predict exactly the number of successful "M"-type satellite missions needed to satisfy our requirements for coverage of specific categories of targets. This will be affected by such things as the programming of the missions, cloud cover, the quality of the photography, and the differing requirements for quality for different categories of targets. On the basis of the current statement of our requirements, however, we believe that to satisfy our requirements at least 12 successful "M"-type missions per year would be needed. It should be borne in mind that many of our key requirements specify coverage of certain targets at intervals during the year, whereas search coverage of large areas of the Soviet Union requires a peaking of coverage during the summer months and a diminution of coverage during the dark months of winter. Therefore, it is necessary for most of the missions to be flown at regular intervals during the year with some peaking during the summer months.

5. In addition to the requirement for the coverage of specific target categories at stated intervals, we require coverage of nearly all of the USSR about once a year. On the basis of prior experience, to get essentially

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cloud-free photography of 75 percent of the rail net of the Soviet Union will require some 7-10 "M"-type missions and for 90 percent some 12-14 "M"-type missions. To reach 95 percent would require a sharp increase to 18-22 missions. The rail net does not, of course, cover the entire Soviet Union, but closely approximates the distribution of the main targets.

6. A successful "J" mission will give us film footage equivalent to two "M" missions in a relatively short period of time. We could not, however, satisfy our requirements completely by substituting one "J" for two "M"s, because the time distribution of coverage is of prime importance to us and many targets require coverage at intervals that we could not be sure of obtaining from the "J"s. As a crude estimate, it might be possible that nine successful "J"s would be an adequate substitute for 12 "M"s, but at the cost of greater workload at NPIC. We will not be able to make a more confident estimate until we have acquired some experience with the "J"s.

7. The NPIC has two groups of photo interpreters available to perform work for the Central Intelligence Agency:

a. Photographic Analysis Group (PAG) with an approved T/O of [REDACTED] and a proposed T/O [REDACTED] photo interpreters. When fully staffed, its photo interpreters will come half from DIA and half from CIA. The Photographic Analysis Group conducts the "national" photo interpretation performed by NPIC. The number of photo interpreters currently available is [REDACTED]

b. Photographic Intelligence Division (PID) with an approved T/O [REDACTED] PIs, a proposed T/O [REDACTED] currently on duty. The PID is made up entirely of CIA personnel and performs work on "departmental" projects requested by the various components of CIA.

8. The preparation of the OAK-type report and the Mission Coverage Index on current photographic reconnaissance missions is performed by the PAG. To determine the impact of current reporting on the NPIC, we reviewed the effect of the reconnaissance program carried out during the first eight months of 1963. We considered only PI time available, assumed there were adequate supporting services, and excluded overtime. We found that during months in which there was no satellite photography processed, current readout of photography collected by aircraft required [REDACTED] of the man days available for photo interpretation under the approved T/O, and almost [REDACTED] of the man days actually available. The processing of satellite

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missions causes the man days devoted to current reporting to increase sharply. For example, two "M"-type satellite missions processed during a month would require an additional [] of the regular time man days available under the approved T/O and approximately an additional [] of the regular time man days of persons actually on board. Over the first eight months of 1963, current reporting used almost [] of the regular time PI man days available and would have absorbed approximately [] of the time available under the approved T/O.* In practice these percentages were sharply reduced by the use of substantial amounts of overtime by NPIC.

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9. The PAG devoted the time not spent in current reporting to the production of research in depth in response to requirements approved by the Advisory Committee. The attached table (Tab B) shows the projects received, projects completed and backlog projects for 1963. It is evident from this table that a large number of projects were received and completed, and that a large backlog of projects remains even though this backlog was reduced during 1963. The next table (Tab C) shows similar information for projects levied by components of CIA on the PID. Again it is evident that large numbers of projects were completed but that a substantial backlog remains. The Office representatives reported, however, that service improved noticeably during recent months.

10. Our recommendation on the number of missions made in paragraph 4 above would not relieve the backlog problem, since on the average it represents a continuation of the pace of the recent past. Nonetheless, we do not believe that it would be wise to reduce the number of missions in order to make more PI time available for research in depth, because the sacrifice of needed coverage would be too great. NPIC's future capability to do current reporting and research in depth will depend not only on the number of missions flown and NPIC's personnel strength, but also on the periodicity of collection activity and the volume of requirements levied on the Center.

* This does not include approximately [] devoted to completing six MCIs which had previously been backlogged.

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12. With regard to coverage of Communist China, we believe most essential search requirements and some requirements for coverage of specific targets can be met as by-products of satellite missions flown against the Soviet Union. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] We see little need for such coverage at this time. There are, however, a number of high priority target systems in Communist China and North Korea that we believe require coverage at least once every six months. The frequency [REDACTED] to cover those targets can be justified on a case-by-case basis.

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Chairman

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Approved For Release 2004/12/15 : CIA-RDP72R00410R000200100011-4

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How
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16 October 1963

The Honorable Brockway McMillan
Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Brock:

This refers to your memorandum of 12 August 1963, Subject: TAGBOARD, in which you reaffirmed the transfer of management responsibilities for TAGBOARD from Program B to Program D. I also refer to subsequent discussions I have had with you and Dr. Fubini in this regard.

The Central Intelligence Agency is now prepared to transfer technical direction of this project from Program B to Program D. The CIA, through the Office of Special Activities, will continue to provide appropriate contractual support, as well as other support, in conformance with the NRO agreement.

Mr. James A. Cunningham is designated the individual in the Office of Special Activities of the DD/S&T, CIA, as the contact for effecting this transfer.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ Pat

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

MSG:bec

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- 1 - Dr. Eugene Fubini

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